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How Did Different Restaurant Segments Perform Differently through the 
Recession? An ARIMA with Intervention Analysis on US Restaurant  
Stock Indices 
 
Introduction 
 
The restaurant industry in the United States represents an inordinately large part 
of the national economy, and is one of the nation’s largest private employers. In 
2012 alone, restaurant sales totaled over $630 billion and the industry employed 
nearly 13 million people (NRA, 2012). The industry, like all other areas of the 
American economy, was profoundly affected by the economic recession that 
began in 2007. As a result of that recession, consumer confidence declined, and 
consumers therefore cut back on much of their discretionary spending; restaurant 
spending representing a substantial portion of that cutback (Barbardo and 
Uchitelle, 2008). 
 This decline in consumer spending, predictably, had an impact on 
restaurant stock prices. The Dow Jones U.S. Restaurant Index (DJRI) dropped by 
13% in 2008 alone (CBS News, 2009). Still, to speak of the restaurant industry as 
a whole is to over-simplify the picture. The DJRI, for instance, includes full 
service restaurants like Olive Garden and Red Lobster, while also including quick 
service restaurants like McDonald’s. Because of the different level of consumer 
spending each segment represents, it is likely that different segments of the 
industry were affected differently by the most recent recession. Recent research 
has shown that recessions have negative impacts on stock prices in general 
(Collins, 2003), and has also shown that restaurant stocks, in particular, are 
affected by recessions (Lee and Ha, 2012). Further research has shown that 
restaurant stocks perform differently based on industry segment (Madanoglu, et. 
al, 2012).  There has not been, however, research performed testing whether the 
recession of 2008 had distinct impacts on different segments of the restaurant 
industry. The goal of this research, therefore, was to assess whether that is the 
case. 
 This research examines two distinct segments of the restaurant industry, 
the full service segment and the limited service segment, and is comprised of two 
different studies, both of which seek to understand whether the recent recession 
had differing impacts on these two distinct industry segments. The research 
measures segment performance by examining the stock prices of restaurants 
within those segments. The first analysis, a time series analysis, examines how 
stock prices in each industry segment were hurt by the recession and how long it 
took them to begin to recover from the recession. The second portion of the study 
consists of a financial ratio analysis of the two segments both before and after the 
recession to better understand how each segment survived the economic downturn. 
  
 This study examined nine hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: the recent recession did not significantly affect the stock 
performance of the U.S. restaurant industry; 
Hypothesis 2: the stock performance of the U.S. restaurant industry didn’t 
significantly improve after the recession; 
Hypothesis 3: the recent recession did not significantly affect the stock 
performance of the limited service restaurant segment; 
Hypothesis 4: the recent recession did not significantly affect the stock 
performance of the full service restaurant segment; 
Hypothesis 5: the stock performance of the limited service restaurant segment 
didn’t significantly improve after the recession; 
Hypothesis 6: the stock performance of the full service restaurant segment didn’t 
significantly improve after the recession; 
Hypothesis 7: there are no significant differences between the financial ratios of 
the limited service restaurant segment and the full service restaurant segment 
before the recession; 
Hypothesis 8: there are no significant differences between the financial ratios of 
the limited service restaurant segment before and after the recession; and 
Hypothesis 9: there are no significant differences between the financial ratios of 
the full service restaurant segment before and after the recession. 
 
Review of Literature 
 
Economic growth is generally cyclical, experiencing alternating periods of growth 
and contraction, or recession. (Lee, 1955; and Schumpeter, 1954). 
During recessionary periods economic indicators are largely negative; GDP is 
reduced, workers' earnings fall, consumer spending declines, and ultimately 
business profits decrease (Krugman, 2009). Consumer demand and corporate 
profitability tend to fall at the early stage of a recession and that lack of 
profitability has a negative impact on a business’ stock price (Mankiw, 1989). 
Recessions generally decrease the velocity of money and squeeze profits, causing 
stock prices to suffer (Patton, 2012), with some investors forecasting devaluation 
of stocks by up to 40% (Gorenstein, 2011).  
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the 
United States experienced an economic recession – defined as consecutive 
quarters of negative growth in gross domestic product - from December 2007 
through June 2009 (The National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). It is 
believed that the recession was the worst one since the Great Depression in terms 
of its duration and impact (Sum, Khatiwada, McLaughlin, & Palma, 2009).  In the 
first 18 months of the recession, gross domestic product (GDP) shrank about 5.1 
percent (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2011). During this recession stock prices 
  
in general fell 50%, losses much larger, relatively, than those associated with 
earlier recessions (Dwyer, 2009). 
 The restaurant industry is particularly vulnerable during times of 
economic distress (Gu, 1993), and this recession has been no different from 
previous downturns. Eating and drinking establishments posted five consecutive 
months of job losses, the first time that had happened sin 1958 (NRA, 2008). The 
restaurant industry, generally speaking, has lower profit margins than other 
industries, averaging between 2% and 6% (Skidelsky, 2009); further exacerbating 
the effect recession has on the industry. As a result, stock prices within the 
restaurant industry declined significantly. In February of 2009, the stock price of 
the top 26 restaurant companies had lost an average 49.3% of their value from 
their highest points over the past 52 weeks (Krantz, 2009). 
 All other things being equal, different restaurant segments tend to perform 
differently as they have different styles of operation, target customers, and 
financial characteristics (Gu, 1996). Full service restaurants generally rely on high 
profit margins; sales of full service restaurant are mainly derived from customers’ 
discretionary expenditures. When recession comes, customer sentiment and 
household income are lower, and full service restaurants are first to feel the 
effects (Youn & Gu, 2010). Fast food restaurants, on the other hand, rely on large 
sales volume to compensate for their lower profit margins. Their sales are 
primarily necessity expenditures; therefore they have more steady revenues (Youn 
& Gu, 2010). 
 Lee and Ha (2012) examined the effect of the recent recession on 
restaurant sales, but did not differentiate among different industry segments. 
Madanoglu, et al. (2008) examined risk-adjusted performance measures, 
differentiating between casual and fast food restaurants, but did so prior to the 
recession. Their research found that, during the period 1998 – 2002, casual dining 
restaurants outperformed fast food restaurants, using the Sharpe Ratio as a 
determinant. While the period 1998 – 2002 did include a recessionary period from 
March of 2001, to November of 2001, Madanoglu, et al. examined the stock 
performance of the two sectors for the five-year period as a whole, and did not 
examine the recessionary period in particular. This paper fills a gap in the 
literature by examining the effect of the recession of 2008 on restaurant stock 
prices by industry segment. 
The use of stock indices to measure general performance trends within 
industries is a widely accepted practice, used to represent the common 
characteristics of component stocks, such as trading on the same stock market 
exchange, belonging to the same industry, or having the same market 
capitalization (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2007). This study 
developed stock indices for overall U.S. restaurant industry, the limited service 
restaurant segment, and the full service restaurant segment and used them as 
  
proxies of stock performance to examine possible impact the recent recession had 
on the U.S. restaurant industry. 
The more usual method for determining stock performance is to use a 
market capitalization-weighted method (Standard & Poor’s, 2011). Market cap 
represents the value of a corporation determined by multiplying the stock price of 
a share by the number of total outstanding shares (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2007). As indicated by Handley (2011) and Standard & Poor’s 
(2011), a weighting based on market cap is thought to be more effective than 
other measurements of stock performance. This method factors in the size of the 
company in determining the performance of the industry segment as a whole. In 
other words, the change of market cap of a company doesn’t affect the index. In 
addition, compared to market cap weighted index, a price-weighted index, such as 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, can be heavily affected by a relatively small 
shift in the price of a large company (Standard & Poor’s, 2011). Therefore, this 
study adopted the S&P 500 approach, or market cap weighted method, to 
calculate three stock indices.   
 
Methods and Data 
 
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether different types of restaurant 
firms performed differently through and after the recent recession and to measure 
the magnitudes of differences, if any. Based on North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS ), two segments of restaurant firms, limited service 
restaurants (NAICS code 722211) and full service restaurants (NAICS 
code722110), a total of sixty-nine publicly traded restaurant firms were identified 
through Mergent Online database (see Appendix B). A weekly stock index was 
developed for each of the two restaurant segments for analysis and comparison. 
To gain a better understanding on the impact of the recession, an overall weekly 
stock index based on all restaurants chosen was also developed and examined. In 
addition, a weekly average of the S&P 500 index was included in the analysis to 
show how the restaurant industry differed from others. To identify and measure 
the differences of the weekly stock performance time series, the study used a 
Time Series with Intervention Analysis procedure to identify the structural breaks 
in each of the four weekly time series data sets.   
To further understand how the restaurant industry was affected by the 
recession, this study used paired samples t-tests to examine the differences for 
each restaurant segment before and after the recession and used independent 
samples t-test to test the differences between the two restaurant segments before 
the recession.  
 
 
  
Time Series with Intervention Analysis 
     Box-Jenkins Procedure 
The Box-Jenkins procedure is a mathematically sophisticated time series analysis 
method that fits Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models to 
time series data (Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 1976). Autoregressive (AR) is a 
process of calculating a time series value as the weighted average of previous 
time series values; Integrated (I) represents order of differencing that makes data 
stationary; and the Moving Average model (MA) states that a time series value is 
the weighted average of forecasting errors of previous time series values. In other 
words, ARIMA models time series data and forecasts future time series values 
based on previous values and forecasting errors. An ARIMA model can be 
denoted as ARIMA (p,d,q) where: 
p
 
represents the autoregressive p order;  
q represents the moving average q order;  
d represents the order of differencing for stationary transforming; 
Because of its unique characteristics, the Box-Jenkins Procedure was 
chosen for time series model fitting. Compared with other time series analysis 
techniques, the Box-Jenkins procedure takes into consideration estimation error 
residuals and lagged dependent variables, which makes model fitting more 
accurate (Box, Jenkins, & Reinsel, 2008). Since it was introduced in the late 
1970s, Box-Jenkins Procedure has achieved great popularity in different fields 
including hospitality and tourism industry-related research. Song, Witt, & Li 
(2009) found that most post-1990 studies on time series analysis of tourism 
demand used the Box-Jenkins procedure. It also has been successfully used in 
hotel and restaurant-related research (Chow, Shyu, & Wang, 1998; Luk, Ferrence, 
& Gmel, 2008). Furthermore, the Box-Jenkins procedure has been proven to be 
superior to other time series analysis techniques in some gaming related studies 
(Cargill & Eadington, 1978; Shonkwiler, 1992; and Eisendrath, Bernhard, Lucas, 
& Murphy, 2008). This study therefore used the Box-Jenkins procedure to fit an 
ARIMA model on each of the four time series for analyses. 
     ARIMA with Intervention Analysis 
Time series are often affected by external events or circumstances such as policy 
changes, advertising promotions, and changes of economic environment. ARIMA 
with Intervention Analysis, an advanced Box-Jenkins modeling approach, was 
designed to identify the impact of those events by detecting structural breaks of a 
time series (Bowerman, Connell, & Koehler, 2005). More specifically, by 
detecting possible differences between the mean values before and after an 
external event, this technique determines whether the event has significant impact 
on a time series and assesses the magnitude of the impact, if any.  
ARIMA with Intervention analysis has been widely used by event impact 
studies in different areas. For example, Box and Tiao (1975) measured the impact 
  
of air pollution law. Montgomery and Weatherby (1980) studied the impacts of 
the Arab oil embargo on sales of electricity in United States. Fox (1996) assessed 
the impact of natural disaster hurricane Hugo on hospital visits in Charleston, 
South Carolina; Koski, Siren, Vuori, and Poikolainen (2007) tested the impact of 
alcohol tax cuts on alcohol-positive sudden deaths in Finland; and Lau, Ip, and 
Lam (2008) applied this technique in performance measurement. Furthermore, the 
ARIMA with Intervention Analysis approach has been used in many hospitality-
related event impact studies and proven successful. The identification of the 
sudden acute respiratory syndrome in 2003 and  terrorist attacks, like the one of 
September 11, 2001, were events that significantly affected the hospitality and 
tourism industry worldwide, the impact of which has been heavily studied and 
ARIMA with Intervention Analysis approach is a commonly used method (Min, 
2008; Lai, 2005; Chen, Kang, & Yang, 2008; Yu, Chan, & Fung, 2006; Fox, 1996; 
Lee, Oh, & O’Leary, 2005; and Ismail, Yahaya, & Efendi, 2009 ). 
Given the purpose of this study, ARIMA with Intervention Analysis 
approach was used to determine how the recent recession affected the U.S. 
restaurant industry. Based on the ARIMA models developed for the four weekly 
stock index time series data sets, the Intervention analysis approach was used to 
detect the structural breaks in the time series.  
t-tests 
Once the impact of the recession on restaurant stock indexes was assessed, ratio 
analyses and comparisons were performed to reveal how the recession affected 
restaurant firms with different financial characteristics. Twenty-six financial 
ratios, thirteen before the recession and thirteen after the recession (ratios shown 
in Appendix A), were calculated for each of the sixty-nine restaurant firms. 
Financial ratios were retrieved from the WRDS database and multiple t-tests were 
performed for comparisons.  
     Paired Samples t-test 
The Paired Samples t-test, also known as repeated measures, is a method of 
comparing mean values of one group of subjects when data are collected from 
two different occasions or under two different conditions (Mendenhall, & Sincich, 
2003). Using financial ratios immediately before and after the recession, this 
method was used to test if any financial ratio changed significantly through the 
recession. One Paired Samples t-test was performed for each ratio. A total of 
twenty-six t-tests, thirteen for limited-service restaurant segment and thirteen for 
full-service restaurant segment, were performed. 
     Independent Samples t-test 
To further understand the uniqueness of each restaurant segment and how 
different financial structures and operation performance might have led to 
different stock performance through the recession, this study also performed 
Independent Samples t-tests on each financial ratio to examine the differences 
  
between the two segments prior to the recession. Since ratios from different 
restaurant firms in two different segments needed to be compared, the 
Independent Samples t-test was chosen because it is a statistical method of 
comparing the mean scores of two different groups of subjects (Mendenhall, & 
Sincich, 2003).  
Data Collection and Preparation 
This study used secondary data from the WRDS database. Daily S&P 500 index 
and daily closing price of sixty-nine publicly traded restaurant firms from January 
2, 2005 through December 26, 2010 (a total of 313 weeks) were collected for the 
development of the time series; and annual reports of the sixty-nine publicly 
traded restaurant firms for the years before and after the recession were retrieved 
for the calculations of financial ratios. 
Weekly time series were used to assess the impact of the recession. Daily 
S&P 500 index and sixty-nine stock prices were converted to weekly data by 
averaging the daily values. The daily S&P500 index was converted to a 313-week 
time series. Using the S&P 500 approach, which is a capitalization-weighted 
method, three 313-week stock index time series were created for the limited-
service restaurant segment (LSR), the full-service restaurant segment (FSR), and 
the overall restaurant industry (OR).  To be comparable, all restaurant stock 
indexes were calculated using base value of 1,186.19, which was the weekly 
average of S&P 500 index for the week of January 2, 2005, the first week of the 
weekly time series.  
 
Data Analysis and Results 
 
To assess whether each of the four weekly time series was significantly affected 
by the recession and experienced significant recovery after the recession, two 
ARIMA with Intervention analyses were performed on each data set to identify 
the impact week and recovery week. In this study, the week a time series started 
showing significant decrease after the recession started was defined as impact 
week; and the week a time series started showing significant increase after the 
recession ended was defined as recovery week. Once the fluctuations of the time 
series were identified and examined, multiple t-tests were performed to gain better 
understandings of the differences between the limited-service restaurant firms, 
full-service restaurant firms, the overall restaurant industry, and the S&P 500. The 
procedures of the ARIMA with Intervention Analysis and t-tests on all four 
weekly time series are identical. 
ARIMA with Intervention Analysis 
     Model Fitting 
Following the procedures proposed by Bowerman et al. (2005), an ARIMA model 
was fitted to each of the four time series. Then, two intervention analyses were 
  
performed based on the ARIMA model to test significant changes of mean levels. 
SAS/ETS Time Series Forecasting System was used for the analyses. 
The model fitting was a three-step process: 1) Model Identification: 
identifying a tentative model; 2) Parameter Estimation: estimating the parameters 
for the tentative model; and 3) Model Validation: diagnosing the tentative model 
for adequacy with Ljung-Box test and identifying an improved model, if 
necessary. The weekly data before the recession, which comprised data from the 
week of January 2, 2005 through November 25, 2007, a total of 152 weeks, were 
used for model fitting. After multiple similar models were tested, model 
ARIMA(4,2,0) without constant was identified to be the model that fit all four 
weekly time series. Tables 1 & 2 list the summary of parameter estimation and 
Ljung-Box statistics for all four time series. 
 
Table 1. Summary of Estimates of Model Parameters 
Parameter Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Full-service Restaurant Segment 
AR1 -0.8318 -10.34 < 0.0005 
AR2 -0.6465 -6.53 < 0.0005 
AR3 -0.4576 -4.61 < 0.0005 
AR4 -0.2517 -3.11 0.002 
Limited-service Restaurant Segment 
AR1 -0.9569 -11.99 < 0.0005 
AR2 -0.7795 -7.61 < 0.0005 
AR3 -0.5838 -5.64 < 0.0005 
AR4 -0.2771 -3.42 0.001 
Overall Restaurant Industry 
AR1 -0.8545 -10.60 < 0.0005 
AR2 -0.7192 -7.28 < 0.0005 
AR3 -0.5187 -5.20 < 0.0005 
AR4 -0.2395 -2.94 0.004 
S&P 500 
AR1 -0.9231 -11.31 < 0.0005 
AR2 -0.749 -7.04 < 0.0005 
AR3 -0.4598 -4.29 < 0.0005 
AR4 -0.1916 -2.27 0.025 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Summary of Ljung-Box Chi-Square Statistic 
Lag Chi-Square df p-value 
Full-service Restaurant Segment 
12 14.1 8 0.078 
24 28.0 20 0.110 
36 41.0 32 0.133 
48 57.5 44 0.083 
Limited-service Restaurant Segment 
12 10.0 8 0.265 
24 27.8 20 0.113 
36 32.6 32 0.439 
48 40.1 44 0.637 
Overall Restaurant Industry 
12 9.8 8 0.280 
24 27.8 20 0.115 
36 34.6 32 0.343 
48 42.1 44 0.553 
S&P 500 
12 13.0 8 0.111 
24 24.4 20 0.225 
36 33.1 32 0.415 
48 45.0 44 0.431 
 
     Intervention Analyses 
Time series intervention analysis was designed to test how the mean levels of a 
time series differ before and after an exogenous event. For each of the four time 
series, two intervention analyses were performed based on the ARIMA model to 
identify possible significant impact and recovery during and after the recession. In 
order to perform an intervention analysis, an event and the time it occurs needed 
to be identified. Using the definition of recession (The National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2010), the two events used in this study were defined as the 
start of the recession in the week of December 2, 2007 and the end of the 
recession in the week of June 28, 2009.  
However, it is common for events to have a lagged effect on a time series. 
In other words, failing to identify significant decrease of the mean level in the 
first week of the recession didn’t mean the stock index was immune to the 
recession. Therefore, for each stock index, if no significant decrease of mean level 
was detected in the first week of the recession, ARIMA with Intervention 
analyses were repeatedly performed in the second week, the third week, the fourth 
week, and so forth until a significant decrease was identified or the end of the data 
set was reached. Identical analyses were performed for testing the recovery. 
  
The time series used for intervention analyses varied among four indices. 
For impact identifying, each time series comprised the weekly index from the 
beginning of the data set, which was January 2, 2005, through the week during the 
recession that had the lowest value. The rest of the time series were used for 
recovery identification, with the time of intervention starting from the first week 
after the recession ended. Tables 3 & 4 provide summary of the time series used 
for intervention analyses. All Intervention analyses were performed based on 
ARIMA(4,2,0) using SAS/ETS Time Series Forecasting System. Tables 5 & 6 list 
the results of the analyses; and Table 7 is a summary of impacts and recoveries 
identified. 
 
Table 3. Weekly Time Series Used for Impact Identifying 
Index Beginning week / Value Ending week / Value 
Full-service Restaurants January 2, 2005 / 1186.19 Nov 16, 2008 / 440.11 
51st week of the recession 
Limited-service 
Restaurants 
January 2, 2005 / 1186.19 March 1, 2009   / 1366.07 
66th week of the recession 
Overall Restaurant 
Industry 
January 2, 2005 / 1186.19 Nov 16, 2008  / 1127.92 
51st week of the recession 
S&P 500 January 2, 2005 / 1186.19 March 1, 2009 / 683.38 
66th week of the recession 
 
Table 4. Weekly Time Series Used for Recovery Identifying 
Index Beginning week / Value Ending week / Value 
Full-service 
Restaurants 
Nov 23, 2008  / 493.08 
52nd week of the recession 
Dec 26, 2010  / 1615.48 
Limited-service 
Restaurants 
Mar 8, 2009 / 1371.68 
67th week of the recession 
Dec 26, 2010   / 2110.15 
Overall Restaurant 
Industry 
Nov 24, 2008 / 1196.76 
52nd week of the recession 
Dec 26, 2010   / 1954.67 
S&P 500 Mar 8, 2009 / 756.55 
67th week of the recession 
Dec 26, 2010   / 1257.64 
 
The results suggest that the stock performance of the limited-service 
restaurant segment was immune to the recession. No significant decrease was 
identified after the recession started. However, although the weekly LSR index 
showed a steady increase after the recession ended (shown in Figure 1), no 
significant increase of mean value was identified after the recession ended. On the 
other hand, both impact and recovery were identified for the full-service 
restaurant segment. In the week of December 2, 2007, the first week of the 
recession, a significant decrease of 57.9 was identified (Table 5); and a significant 
  
increase of 68.45 was identified in the week of December, 27, 2009, which was 
twenty-seven weeks after the recession ended (Table 6). In other words, compared 
to that of LSR, stock performance of the FSR was more sensitive to the changes 
of market conditions and more volatile through and after the recession. As shown 
in Figure 1, the FSR index has the steepest slope before and after the recession. 
However, it seems that it took longer for FSR to start to recover from the 
recession. The plot for FSR index (Figure 1) is flat between weeks 236 and 262, 
which is between the end of the recession and the week the FSR index started 
showing a significant increase and represents the lagged period for FSR to recover.  
Significant impacts were also identified for the overall restaurant industry 
index and S&P 500 index for 59.1 and 55.9, respectively. As shown in Table 5, 
the OR index started showing a significant decrease in the first week of the 
recession; but the S&P 500 index wasn’t significantly affected by the recession 
until the week of August 31, 2008, the fortieth week of the recession. This 
difference confirms the theory that the restaurant industry stocks are riskier and 
more volatile than the overall market. 
Due to its larger market cap (shown in Table 8), LSRs might have had 
some influence on the results of this study even though no significant impact or 
recovery was identified on LSR index. The decrease in the LSR index wasn’t 
significant enough to be detected by the intervention analysis, but it did decrease 
largely after the recession started, which might have contributed to the fluctuation 
of the OR index and led to a slightly larger decrease on OR than on FSR (59.1 vs. 
57.9). For the same possible reasons, no recovery was identified in the OR index 
after the recession ended. Although the FSR index had a significant recovery of 
68.5, it had a much smaller market cap than LSRs did and represented only about 
22% of the OR market cap. 
 
Figure 1. Grouped Plots of Four Weekly Time Series    
 
  
 
  
Table 5. Impact Weeks Identified 
Parameters Estimate t-statistic p value 
Full-service Restaurant 
AR(1) -0.78174 -11.2492 < .0001 
AR(2) -0.60145 -7.1521 < .0001 
AR(3) -0.47249 -5.6248 < .0001 
AR(4) -0.23549 -3.3462 0.0010 
week of Dec 2, 2007 -57.89853 -2.2619 0.0248 
Overall Restaurant Industry 
AR(1) -0.75963 -11.4309 < .0001 
AR(2) -0.54605 -6.9730 < .0001 
AR(3) -0.46647 -5.9404 < .0001 
AR(4) -0.25657 -3.8484 0.0002 
week of Dec 2, 2007 -59.10428 -2.3203 0.0213 
S&P 500 
AR(1) -0.90615 -13.8599 < .0001 
AR(2) -0.64130 -7.8289 < .0001 
AR(3) -0.55621 -6.7582 < .0001 
AR(4) -0.31220 -4.7076 < .0001 
week of Aug 31, 2008 -55.89321 -2.7161 0.0072 
 
Table 6. Recovery Week Identified 
Parameters Estimate t-statistic p value 
Full-service Restaurant Segment 
AR(1) 
AR(2) 
AR(3) 
AR(4) 
week of Dec 27, 2009 
-0.64142 
-0.50531 
-0.35685 
-0.20233 
68.44682 
-7.7949 
-5.4614 
-3.8705 
-2.5271 
1.9230 
< .0001 
< .0001 
0.0002 
0.0125 
0.0563 
 
Table 7. Summary of Impact and Recovery Weeks 
Impact Recovery 
Full-service Restaurants  
week of Dec 2, 2007 week of Dec 27, 2009 
Limited-service Restaurants  
No significant impact No Significant Increase until 2010 
Overall Restaurant Industry  
week of Dec 2, 2007 Not recovered until 2010 
S&P 500  
week of Aug 31,2008 Not recovered until 2010 
 
  
 
Table 8. Market Capitalization of Restaurant Segments (in thousands). 
Week Full-service 
Restaurant 
Segment 
(Proportion) 
Limited-service 
Restaurant Segment 
(Proportion) 
Overall 
Restaurant 
Industry 
(Proportion) 
January 2, 2005 31,284,699 
(32.03%) 
66,385,153 
(67.97%) 
97,669,852 
(100%) 
December 2, 
2007 
25,681,870 
(19.88%) 
103,486,012 
(80.12%) 
129,167,882 
(100%) 
June 21, 2009 18,407,540 
(17.85%) 
84,710,578 
(82.15%) 
103,118,118 
(100%) 
December 26, 
2010 
32,114,305 
(22.75%) 
109,067,737 
(77.25%) 
141,182,042 
(100%) 
 
t-tests of Ratios 
The results of ARIMA with Intervention analyses provided investors with insights 
on the performance trends of three stock indices through the recession. To 
understand how different segments behaved differently from a managers’ 
perspective and help managers make informed decisions in coping with possible 
economic downturns in the future, this study further examined the changes of 
financial ratios of LSRs and FSRs through the recession. Multiple t-tests were 
performed to compare the average financial ratios. Paired Samples t-tests were 
performed on the limited-service restaurant segment and full-service restaurant 
segment to identify possible significant changes of financial ratios through the 
recession. Results listed in Table 9 indicate that none of LSR segment’s financial 
ratios significantly changed through the recession, which mirrors the findings of 
the intervention analysis. Again, the LSR segment appears to be immune to the 
recession.  
However, the average Debt Ratio of FSRs showed significant increase and 
Debt-to-Equity ratio of FSRs showed modestly significant increase through the 
recession (shown in Table 10). By the end of the recession, about 56% of the 
assets in FSR were financed with debt and approximate 80% of operating and 
financing activities were financed with debt. The significant increases of these 
two debt ratios imply that FSRs had difficult time raising funds from the stock 
markets during the recession, which is also reflected by the 28.3% decrease of 
FSR market cap through the recession.  
 
 
 
 
  
Table 9. Results of paired samples t-test for limited service restaurants 
Ratio Average 
before 
recession 
Average 
after 
recession 
t-value Sig. 
two-tailed 
Liquidity 
Current Ratio (n=15) 1.2964 1.2169 .389 .703 
Quick Ratio (n=15) .9862 .8312 .847 .411 
Leverage 
Debt Ratio (n=14) .8064 .8573 -.336 .742 
Debt-to-Equity (n=11) 3.7193 4.6282 -.357 .728 
Times Interest Earned (n=15) 185.6669 -
124.3671 
1.266 .226 
Profitability 
Gross Profit Margin (n=15) .2865 .2831 .259 .800 
Net Profit Margin (n=15) .0761 .0447 .945 .361 
Return on Investment (n=12) .0853 .0548 .881 .397 
Return on Stockholder’s Equity 
(n=11) 
.1470 .2060 -.363 .724 
Asset Management 
Inventory Turnover (n=15) 74.3498 73.4794 .236 .817 
Total Asset Turnover (n=15) 1.7361 1.8559 -.692 .500 
Market-based 
P/E (n=15) 33.6460 19.6422 .643 .531 
P/BV (n=15) 1.1329 7.0399 -1.684 .114 
 
An Independent Samples t-test was performed to identify possible 
differences between the financial ratios of LSRs and FSRs at the beginning of the 
recession. The results listed in Table 11 indicate that Gross Profit Margin Ratios 
were identified to be significantly different between the two segments and Debt 
Ratios and P/E ratios were identified to be modestly significantly different 
between two segments. Although the limited-service segment constantly had 
higher Debt Ratio through the recession, its higher Gross Profit Margin might 
have indicated promising earning growth, which consequently led to its higher 
P/E ratio. This further explains LSR’s stronger stock performance through the 
recession. Although the market cap of LSR shrunk about 18.1% during the 
eighteen-month recession, versus 28.3% decrease of FSR, the debt ratios of LSR 
didn’t show any significant changes through the recession (Table 9). In other 
words, LSR might have difficulties raising funds through the recession, but the 
increase of overall debt is not statistically significant. 
 
 
  
Table 10. Results of paired samples t-test for full service restaurants 
Ratio Average 
before 
Recessio
n 
Average 
after 
Recessio
n 
t-value Sig. 
two-tailed 
Liquidity 
Current Ratio (n=31) 1.1018 .9528 .944 .353 
Quick Ratio (n=31) .7938 .6613 .811 .424 
Leverage 
Debt Ratio (n=31) .4167 .5621 -3.757 .001 
Debt-to-Equity (n=30) .8276 4.1277 -1.712 .098 
Times Interest Earned (n=25) 81.4394 20.5291 1.324 .198 
Profitability 
Gross Profit Margin (n=31) .2316 .2170 1.685 .102 
Net Profit Margin (n=31) -.0433 .0242 -.834 .411 
Return on Investment (n=26) .0758 .0554 1.515 .142 
Return on Stockholder’s Equity 
(n=30) 
.0915 -.0172 1.613 .118 
Asset Management 
Inventory Turnover (n=30) 81.0008 72.6084 .777 .443 
Total Asset Turnover (n=31) 1.4845 1.6203 -1.524 .138 
Market - based 
P/E (n=31) 19.2153 -2.8367 .686 .498 
P/BV (n=31) 2.9048 3.7762 -.967 .341 
 
Overall, this study found that the limited-service restaurant segment 
weathered the recession well and no significant impact of the recession on the 
segment was identified. In fact, four of the twenty limited service restaurant firms 
had losses in the year before recession; and only two had losses in the year after 
recession. Two of the four restaurants actually started to have earnings through 
the recession. On the other hand, once the recession ended, the full-service 
restaurant segment recovered very rapidly; but no significant increase of stock 
index was identified for LSRs. In addition, although the restaurant industry seems 
to be more volatile than overall market, the limited-service restaurant segment 
appears to have less risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 11. Pre-recession results of independent samples t-tests. 
Ratio Average for 
Limited-
Service 
Restaurants 
Average for 
Full-
Service 
Restaurants 
t-value Sig. 
two-
tailed 
Liquidity 
Current Ratio (df=63) 1.2584 1.0462 .987 .327 
Quick Ratio (df=62) .9132 .7284 .831 .409 
Leverage 
Debt Ratio (df=21.771) .6976 .4571 1.739 .096 
Debt-to-Equity (df=15.171) 2.7825 .9444 1.078 .298 
Times Interest Earned (df=56) 147.6913 63.2174 .557 .579 
Profitability 
Gross Profit Margin (df=63) .2722 .2130 2.031 .046 
Net Profit Margin (df=63) .0711 -.0262 1.074 .287 
Return on Investment (df=50) .1006 .1119 -.141 .888 
Return on Stockholder’s 
Equity (df=53) 
.1401 .0722 1.398 .168 
Asset Management 
Inventory Turnover (df=58) 72.6091 79.5977 -.407 .686 
Total Asset Turnover (df=59) 1.7009 1.5623 .789 .434 
Market-based 
P/E (df=63) 31.1338 .2202 1.705 .093 
P/BV(df=19.261) 1.3981 2.5298 -.878 .391 
 
Summary of Results 
Using the ARIMA with Intervention Analysis technique and t-tests, this study 
examined nine hypotheses to explore the behaviors of performance trends of the 
three restaurant stock indices (hypotheses #1 ~ #6) and changes in financial ratios 
of different restaurant segments (hypotheses #7 ~ #9) through the recent recession. 
The results of ARIMA analyses suggest that hypotheses #1, #4, and #6 to be 
rejected and hypotheses #2, #3, and #5 not to be rejected (shown in Tables 5 & 6). 
In addition, the t-tests identified significant differences among some of the 
financial ratios in different restaurant segments through the recession (shown in 
Tables 9, 10, and 11).  
 
Discussion 
 
The first thing to remark on is the weeks of impact and recovery of the restaurant 
industry as a whole and the two individual industry segments being analyzed. In 
  
the case of the industry as a whole, the week of December 2, 2007 is the week the 
recession first had an impact on the stock prices of restaurant companies, and the 
prices did not recover until the first part of 2010. This impact was mirrored by the 
performance of full service restaurant stocks as well as the S&P 500 as a whole. 
Interestingly, though, limited service restaurant stock prices were not significantly 
affected by the recession at all, and therefore did not need to recover. 
 When looking at the paired sample t-test examining the financial 
performance of full service restaurants, it is noted that full service restaurants took 
on a significantly higher level of debt during the recent recession, both in terms of 
debt ratio (p<0.05) and debt to equity ratio (p<0.1). While gross profit margin was 
not significantly lower (p=0.102), the result of the t-test was very close to being 
statistically significant. When examining these same numbers for the limited 
service restaurant segment of the industry, there are no significant differences 
found between pre- and post-recession financial performance. 
 These results demonstrate quite clearly that limited service restaurants 
(LSRs), in general, survived the recession with much greater ease than full service 
restaurants (FSRs). LSRs did not see a decline in stock price during the recession 
and managed to maintain profitability without having to take on additional debt. 
FSRs, on the other hand, managed to maintain their profit margins, if only just, 
but did so at the expense of taking on greater debt. 
 These results are informative for industry on a number of levels. First is 
the notion that the limited service restaurant segment was able to weather the 
most severe recession in the United States since the Great Depression better than 
the full service restaurant segment. Certainly, if investors can count on LSR 
stocks not to decline in the face of such a sharp economic downturn, these sorts of 
restaurants represent a far more secure investment than FSR, for investors and 
operators alike. 
 Second, there is mounting evidence that the United States economy, while 
technically not in recession, is not expected to rebound fully any time in the near 
future (Barro, 2012). As of July 26, 2012, Treasury Real Yield Curve Rates – the 
interest rates the United States government pays on bonds that are indexed to 
inflation – were negative for all bonds of less than twenty years maturity (United 
States Department of the Treasury, 2012) (see appendix c). In other words, for 
every maturity of bonds under 20 years, investors are paying the federal 
government to take their money. This suggests quite strongly that investors are 
pessimistic about the ability of the U.S. economy to create significant gains in the 
coming years (Krugman, 2012). Investor pessimism about prospects for the real 
economy makes the perceived safe haven of U.S. debt attractive even at very low 
yields (Krugman, 2012). For operators of FSRs, then, this suggests a major 
realignment of strategic thinking is in order. Since the stock prices of these 
companies first reacted to the recession in December, 2007, FSRs have purchased 
  
continued profitability at the expense of ever greater debt. If the economy 
continues as expected this is clearly not a sustainable course of action. Operators 
of FSRs must quickly come to grips with the reality of the new, less vibrant 
economy. For investors, this means moving money away from FSRs and into 
LSRs might be in order. 
 Adding urgency this problem for FSRs is the notion that the U.S. economy 
might be headed for a “double-dip” recession, and given that the European 
economy is experiencing just such a recession, those fears may not be unjustified 
(UK SME, 2012). Should the U.S. economy experience such a backslide; FSRs 
will face more severe challenges given that it was significantly affected by the 
recent recession and its overall debt ratios have worsened through the recession. 
A change in strategic thinking on the part of FSR managers, therefore, is not only 
a necessity, but a pressing one. 
 This study was limited by the fact that only publicly held restaurant 
companies were surveyed. Privately owned companies and those not large enough 
to have their stocks listed on large exchanges may have been affected differently 
than larger concerns. Opportunities for further research include incorporating 
these other companies into the research, as well as examining LSRs more closely 
to determine whether they actually are “recession proof.” 
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APPENDIX A: Financial Ratios 
Ratio Formula 
Liquidity  
Current Ratio 
 
 			
 

	
 
Quick Ratio 
 
Current assets   inventories   prepaid expenses
current liabilities
 
Leverage  
Debt Ratio Total debt/ Total assets 
Debt-to-Equity Ratio Total debt/ Total equity 
Times Interest Earned Ratio Earnings before interest and taxes/ Interest Charges 
Profitability  
Gross Profit Margin Ratio Sales- Cost of sales/ sales (revenue) 
Net Profit Margin Ratio Earnings after taxes (EAT)/sales 
Return on Investment Ratio Earnings after taxes (EAT)/ Total assets 
Return on Stockholder’s Equity Ratio Earnings after taxes (EAT)/ Stockholders’ equity 
Asset Management  
Inventory Turnover Ratio Cost of sales/ Average inventory 
Total Asset Turnover Sales/ Total assets 
Market-based  
Price-to-Earnings (P/E) Ratio Market price per share/ Current earnings per share 
Market-to-Book (P/BV) Ratio Market price per share/ Book value per share 
 
APPENDIX B: Restaurant Firms 
(identified through Mergent Online database) 
722211 limited service (20) 722110 full service (49) 
AFC Enterprises Inc. AFCE Applebee's International, Inc. APPB 
Burger King Holdings Inc. BKC Ark Restaurants Corp. ARKR 
Caribou Coffee Inc. CBOU Back Yard Burgers, Inc. BYBI 
Carrols Restaurant Group 
Inc. 
TAST Benihana Inc. BNHNA 
Checkers Drive-In 
Restaurants 
CHKR Biglari Holdings Inc. BH 
CKE Restaurants, Inc. CKR BJ's Restaurants Inc. BJRI 
COSI Inc. COSI Bob Evans Farms, Inc. BOBE 
Domino’s Pizza Inc. DPZ Bravo Brio Restaurant Group 
Inc. 
BBRG 
Einstein Noah Restaurant BAGL Brinker International, Inc. EAT 
  
Group 
Good Times Restaurants 
Inc. 
GTIM BUCA Inc. BUCA 
Jack in the Box, Inc. JACK Buffalo Wild Wings Inc. BWLD 
McDonald's Corp MCD California Pizza Kitchen Inc. CPKI 
Nathan's Famous, Inc. NATH CEC Entertainment, Inc. CEC 
Papa John's International, 
Inc. 
PZZA Champps Entertainment, Inc. CMPP 
Red Robin Gourmet Burgers 
Inc. 
RRGB Cheesecake Factory Inc. CAKE 
Ryan's Restaurant Group 
Inc. 
RYAN Chipotle Mexican Grill Inc. CMG 
Sonic Corp. SONC Cracker Barrel Old Country 
Store, Inc. 
CBRL 
Wendy's International, Inc. WEN Darden Restaurants, Inc. DRI 
Worldwide Restaurant 
Concepts 
SZ Denny's Corp DENN 
Yum! Brands, Inc. YUM DineEquity Inc. DIN 
  Elmer's Restaurants, Inc. ELMS 
  Famous Dave's of America 
Inc. 
DAVE 
  Flanigan's Enterprises, Inc. BDL 
  Friendly Ice Cream Corp FRN 
  Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. FRS 
  Granite City Food & 
Brewery Ltd 
GCFB 
  J. Alexander's Corp JAX 
  Jamba Inc. JMBA 
  Kona Grill Inc. KONA 
  Landry's Restaurants, Inc. LNY 
  Lone Star Steakhouse & 
Saloon, Inc. 
STAR 
  Luby's, Inc. LUB 
  Main Street Restaurant 
Group Inc. 
MAIN 
  Max & Erma's Restaurants, 
Inc. 
MAXE 
  McCormick & Schmicks 
Seafood Restaurants Inc. 
MSSR 
  Morton's Restaurant Group 
Inc. 
MRT 
  
 
APENDIX C: Daily Treasury Real Yield Curve Rates 
Date 5 YR 7 YR 10 YR 20 YR 30 YR 
07/02/12 -1.04 -0.81 -0.50 0.10 0.51 
07/03/12 -1.08 -0.82 -0.48 0.14 0.53 
07/05/12 -1.12 -0.86 -0.51 0.10 0.50 
07/06/12 -1.12 -0.87 -0.53 0.08 0.48 
07/09/12 -1.14 -0.89 -0.57 0.03 0.43 
07/10/12 -1.16 -0.92 -0.59 0.01 0.40 
07/11/12 -1.15 -0.90 -0.57 0.03 0.41 
07/12/12 -1.13 -0.90 -0.58 0.00 0.39 
07/13/12 -1.15 -0.91 -0.59 -0.01 0.38 
07/16/12 -1.18 -0.94 -0.61 -0.02 0.37 
07/17/12 -1.16 -0.92 -0.59 0.00 0.40 
07/18/12 -1.19 -0.94 -0.60 0.00 0.40 
07/19/12 -1.20 -0.97 -0.62 -0.01 0.40 
07/20/12 -1.18 -0.98 -0.67 -0.08 0.33 
07/23/12 -1.18 -0.98 -0.68 -0.09 0.32 
07/24/12 -1.13 -0.95 -0.68 -0.11 0.31 
07/25/12 -1.12 -0.94 -0.67 -0.10 0.31 
Source: United States Department of the Treasury 
  Mexican Restaurants, Inc. CASA 
  O'Charley's Inc. CHUX 
  OSI Restaurant Partners Inc. OSI 
  P.F. Chang's China Bistro, 
Inc. 
PFCB 
  Panera Bread Co. PNRA 
  Quality Dining, Inc. QDIN 
  RARE Hospitality 
International, Inc. 
RARE 
  Rubio's Restaurants, Inc. RUBO 
  Ruby Tuesday, Inc. RT 
  Ruth's Hospitality Group Inc. RUTH 
  Star Buffet, Inc. STRZ 
  Texas Roadhouse Inc. TXRH 
  Western Sizzlin Corp WEST 
